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Public Benefit and
Private Interest

Chronicles of the
Hyde Park Paper Mill

Jeffrey E. Lindenthal

Until

it

was mothballed and put up for sale

in

December 1987, a small paper mill

Park, a neighborhood on the outskirts of Boston

's

city limits,

in

Hyde

was the oldest continuously

operating paper mill in the United States. This particular plant closing occurred at a time
in the state had fallen offprecipitously. It also coincided with
an awareness among some policymakers that recycling programs were urgently needed to
combat a garbage glut, in Massachusetts and states across the nation, attributable to an
increasingly wasteful society and dwindling landfill capacity. Efforts to reopen the Hyde

manufacturing employment

Park mill served
tion,
is

to illuminate

a host ofpublic policy concerns, including deindustrializarecycling. This episode in the life of the Hyde Park mill

economic development, and

a story ofpublic and private interest and the complexities that emerge when reconciling
community institution, partnerships renewed, and a commitment to

the two, as well as of a

carry both into the future.

Whereas the Making Paper within this Province

will

be of Public Benefit and Service;

But inasmuch as the Erecting mills for that purpose and providing
Materials for the Effecting that Undertaking will necessarily

Workmen and

demand

a considerable

Disburse of Money for some time before any profit, or gain can arise there-from;

And

Whereas Daniel Henchman, Gillam Phillips, Benjamin Faneuil, and Thomas Hancock, together with Henry Dering are willing & desirous to Undertake the Manufacturing Paper: Wherefore for the Promoting so beneficial a Design; Be it Enacted by
His Excellency the Governour, Council and Representatives in General Court Assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That the sole Privilege and Benefit of making
Paper within

this

Province shall be to the said men, and to their Associates, for and

during the Term of Ten Years

made

.

.

.

men shall make or cause to be
Two hundred Rheam of
Sixty Rheam thereof at least to

Provided the aforesaid

within this Province, in the space of Twelve

Months

.

.

.

good Merchantable Brown Paper, and Printing Paper,
be Printing Paper, and within the space of Twelve Months next coming,
be made within

this

Province Fifty

shall cause to

Rheam of good Merchantable Writing

Paper, of

commonly stampt with the London Arms, over and
Two hundred Rheam of Brown Paper, and Printing Paper.

equal goodness with the Paper

above the aforesaid

Jeffrey E. Lindenthal,

a June 1989 graduate of the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs Master of
is a recycling specialist in San Diego, California.

Science program, University of Massachusetts at Boston,
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An

act passed

by the Massachusetts General Court on September 28, 1728,

New England"

courage the making of paper in

— an early precedent for public

local production of paper to five

prominent Bostonians

participation in private ventures

deemed to be in the best

Papermaking

is

fifty

matured

in the colonies,

Park paper mill

Boston's

last

years ago.

The

fledgling

in mills scattered

Hyde

American paper

remaining claim to a share of colonial

versary and "the mill," as this plant

is

commonwealth.
Neponset

is

industry,

throughout the Northeast. The Hyde

paper manufacturing heritage. The year 1989 marked

in the local

interest of the

in the city of Boston originated in small mills built along the

River more than two hundred

spawned

to "en-

granted a ten-year monopoly on

its

New England's

one hundred eighty-eighth anni-

popularly known, a widely recognized institution

community.

Park, a small Boston neighborhood bordered on the north by the Neponset River,

approximately eight miles southeast of the state capitol. The mill sprawls along River

Street

between Mattapan and Cleary squares

in a largely residential area.

From

the road

the mill takes shape as a rambling assemblage of single-story red brick buildings that

appear to have been tacked on gradually over the years. The
acres of shop space on

its

twenty-acre

site. Inside,

facility

houses more than ten

two vintage "fourdrinier" papermak-

The
where continuous sheets of newly formed paper
pass through a long series of steam dryers that generate enough heat to keep the huge area
warm in the winter and hot in the summer.
Until the plant was idled in December 1987, it was the oldest continuously operating
paper mill in the country. In fact, the Hyde Park mill is a contemporary of the papermaking operation begun with support from the Massachusetts General Court in 1728. Beginning in December 1987, this case study chronicles the plant's first protracted shutdown.
Throughout this period the future of the mill remained uncertain despite the fact that two
hundred paperworkers were off the job, that the mill had operated continuously for 186
ing machines form the centerpiece of the manufacturing area in the rear of the plant.

machines stretch across the shop

1

floor,

years, and that several parties appeared willing to purchase the operation with hopes of

reviving the manufacture of paper on the Neponset River.

The public

policy implications of this case concern the

of Boston, and the

Commonwealth

Hyde Park community,

the city

of Massachusetts. Given the mill's long-term ability to

provide stable jobs, a permanent plant closing would have major economic repercussions
in the

Hyde Park would also underscore
economy in recent years. City economic
first involved themselves in the case when the James River Corpo-

Hyde Park community. Another plant

closing in

the gradual decline of manufacturing in the state

development

officials

ration, after four years of ownership,

mill

announced

in July

on the market and intended to cease operations

1987 that they were putting the

in three

months whether or not a

buyer was found. The immediate future of the plant's jobs were of vital concern to Hyde
Park's public leaders, Boston

mayor Raymond Flynn, and of course,

Apart from compelling economic and social motivations, efforts

the paperworkers.

to

reopen the mill also

focused attention on environmental public policy issues relating to the state's solid waste
disposal crisis.

The

mill possesses a rare physical asset in the paper industry: an on-site

de-inking facility whose machines allow for the removal of ink from wastepaper.
is

extracted from wastepaper

in the

it

may

Once

ink

then be repulped (forming the feedstock or "furnish"

production cycle) and recycled. Given the mill's urban location far from the virgin

pulp forests of northern

New

England, de-inking wastepaper

virgin pulp feedstock in the manufacturing process.

10

is

an abundant alternative to

Shortly after the mill was put up for sale, one potential buyer
to capitalize

on wastepaper de-inking

in the

came forward with

plans

manufacturing process. But to implement

this

plan the buyer needed publicly guaranteed financial support, assurance of a reliable supply of low-cost wastepaper, and

— as became increasingly clear as months passed by —

political leverage to help secure the

leverage were

how much

all

purchase of the property. Financing, wastepaper, and

variables considered to be within the realm of city or state control. Just

control and to what extent public officials could be expected to push the pro-

posed plan became the nexus for debate surrounding the future of the Hyde Park
This particular company was not, however, the only party interested

mill.

in the mill.

Throughout the fourteen-month shutdown several potential buyers were said to be formulating business plans. One would-be purchaser even appeared to have reached agreement
with the James River Corporation, only to be forced to withdraw

its

offer after a question-

able financial transaction. In an effort to screen potential buyers and evaluate the ability

of each to retain jobs, the city's Economic Development and Industrial Corporation

(EDIC) requested the

right to review any proposals that

came forward. EDIC was

prepared to help a prospective buyer coordinate financing should the need

also

arise.

The paperworkers union, meanwhile, growing increasingly concerned that James River
was not acting in good faith to sell the facility, organized a plant-closing campaign and
adopted the theme "Don't Kill the Mill." This effort galvanized wide-ranging public
support that included a City Hall rally and eventually the specter of arrest at a downtown

The union's defense of their jobs served to polarize the issue of corporate
Hyde Park. James River's decision to cease operations may also be
viewed within the larger context of "deindustrialization" or the trend among burgeoning

picket line.

responsibility in

corporations to cast off mature assets in the interest of short-term profits and reinvest-

ment.

The

revitalization of the

nity for the

Hyde Park mill was heralded by some

to

be a model opportu-

governor and one-time presidential hopeful to demonstrate his commitment to

ensuring "good jobs at good wages," to combating urgent environmental issues, and to
reinforcing Massachusetts's frayed industrial base. Others would say that plans for the

Hyde Park mill simply represented too

great a public risk

— a challenge best left to the

At a ribbon-cutting ceremony celebrating the reopening of the mill in April
1989, one state official speculated that without a "partnership" born out of public involvement, the mill might never have resumed operations. Mayor Flynn termed the expe-

private sector.

rience a

"model

pronouncements

Origins of the

for
is

any future plant closings in Boston." The genesis of these public

the subject of this case study.

Hyde Park Paper Mill

The history of papermaking in Massachusetts begins with a tale of publicly granted privilege and private initiative. As the eighteenth century dawned in New England, Boston had
become a hub for printing and bookbinding commerce in the colonies — trade that relied
on a steady supply of paper imported from Europe. In an effort to reduce dependence on
imports, lawmakers were instrumental in helping the infant paper industry take hold in the
New World by granting exclusive contracts and production subsidies. The manufacture of
paper was regarded as a basic public necessity, and government officials employed their
powers to help underwrite development of the craft

The

five partners in the publicly

in these early industrial policies.

2

"encouraged" mill project of 1728 included Thomas

Hancock, uncle of John Hancock, the Massachusetts governor and signer of the Declara-

11
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tion of Independence,

and Benjamin Faneuil, father of Faneuil Hall developer Peter Fafirst superintendent of this mill, was the only member of the

neuil. Henry Dering, the

group who had any experience running a paper

mill. Shortly after

production contract, the proprietors bought an ad in the

being awarded their

New England

Weekly Journal

requesting citizens to "save or procure linen rags" for which they would pay cash. This

was

still

many

years before

wood pulp would be used

in the

manufacturing process. Cot-

ton fiber was the primary feedstock for these early mills, and recycling rags offered the

most readily available supply. The men leased a mill building along the Neponset River
Dorchester and set about the business of papermaking. 3
Ten years passed, but the quality of paper produced

at the mill

could

still

in

not rival that

of the European imports, a deficiency the owners blamed on the lack of skilled paper-

workers

Ownership of the mill changed several times in subsequent years, and
hand in its future in 1764, when the Massachusetts legislature
a £400 grant to repair the mill, which was granted.

in the area.

elected officials again had a

was petitioned

for

In 1801, two "practical papermakers,"

on the Neponset River

established a mill

would own. 4 The

site

Edmund Tileston and Mark Hollingsworth,
Mattapan, the first of many mills the partners

in

of the Tileston and Hollingsworth mill was not far from a spot in

Dorchester where the town, with an interest in collecting taxes on the property, had
granted land to a Milton papermaker to establish a mill in 1773. 5 The Tileston and Hollingsworth

The

mill

company leased this

was destroyed by

mill in

fire in

1806 and purchased the

facility thirty

1837 and the partners built a new

years

later.

facility adjacent to the

old site and chose to remove their Mattapan operations to the location as well. This

is

the

Hyde Park mill on the Neponset River, its origination commonly traced to 1801.
The Tileston and Hollingsworth Hyde Park mill was noted for its fine plate paper, which

site

of the

the U.S. government once adopted as

its

standard, and for high-quality printing paper

favored by the likes of Scribner 's Magazine. Ownership of the

from Edmund and Mark
and Amor, and remained
to the

Diamond

The Best

Little

to their sons

Edmund Jr. and Amor,

in the Tileston

Hyde Park mill passed

to the sons of

and Hollingsworth families

Edmund Jr.

until the mill

was sold

International Corporation in the 1950s.

Paper Company

in

America

The James River Corporation was founded

when engineers Brenton Halsey and

in 1969,

Robert Williams completed a leveraged paper mill buyout from their employer, the Ethyl
Corporation. Over the next ten years the

men developed the company by

seeking bargain-

basement deals on antiquated mills owned by larger corporations while carving
selves a niche in the

market

6

for specialty papers. In 1981 the

company's

sales

for

them-

exceeded

$500 million, a figure that would surpass $1.5 billion by 1983. Forbes magazine named
James River "the best little paper company in America" in January 1984, noting that for
the previous five years the

company had boasted

a

26 percent average return on share-

holders' equity.

James River acquired the Hyde Park mill on July

1 1

,

1983 as part of a five-mill pack,

age purchased from Diamond International Corporation for approximately $160 million.
In addition to the
tissue products,

Hyde Park

facility,

the deal included plants manufacturing towel and

communication papers, a pulp

mill,

wood-chipping operations, and as-

sorted pulp and paper inventories. In their fiscal year 1984 annual report, the

estimated that the

Diamond

sales base. Acquisitions such as this

company

would add $200 million to James River's annual
were part of a deliberate strategy to integrate James

acquisition

12

River operations more fully by acquiring major pulp reserves and to diversify the

company's product

line.

In the fiscal year ending April 24, 1988,

James River devoted considerable resources

European

international development with the purchase of four

corporate expansion had transformed the

owner of 133

tion,

company

into a

entities.

to

Such aggressive

$5 billion multinational corpora-

plants worldwide, the industry's second-largest paper manufacturer.

But despite record-breaking

sales, the

company's

profitability

had begun

to slip.

James

River's corporate growing pains were aggravated in the mid-eighties as the value of the
dollar dropped

and pulp prices

rose. In a two-year period beginning in

mid-1986, virgin

pulp prices had increased more than 65 percent. For a nonintegrated paper company like
one that did not own 100 percent of its pulp supply
increases in the price
James River
of raw materials would cut into profits. Return on shareholders' equity in fiscal year 1988
dipped to 10.7 percent, a healthy return but well below the industry average of 18 percent.

—

—

In the United States the
essential operations"

company continued

fiscal year 1988. Later that year
sippi,

expand and moved

to sell smaller

"non-

James River acquired new

assets in

Michigan and Missis-

and a groundwood directory business producing telephone book paper was sold

Washington
ter

to

— a category that included the Hyde Park mill in the early months of

for

$75 million. At the close of fiscal 1988, James River reported

in

that a "let-

of intent," with an option to purchase, had been signed with a third party for the

Hyde

Park mill. After deducting losses incurred from the December 1987 Hyde Park shutdown

from the

sale of the

Washington

mill, officials estimated the transactions

would yield a net

favorable gain of approximately $.02 per share
Ironically,

James River's Hyde Park venture

first

appeared to offer the Boston paper-

workers a new beginning. In the months preceding the 1983 sale of the mill, paperworkers had

begun

to

worry about the future of their jobs. Diamond International had recently

been bought by the notorious British corporate raider Sir James Goldsmith, a

had amassed a fortune
the mill

would be

"as low as

it

selling

man who

such acquisitions piece by piece. The union assumed that

and for eight or nine months morale had been

sold, possibly closed,

could go" in the plant.

James River Opens and Closes a Chapter
The

sale of the

Hyde Park mill

to another

paper manufacturer was a positive sign for the

workers. But from the outset, James River's long-term plans for the mill were never completely understood.

Union

officials recall being told

"didn't want the mill" and were

much more

by company management that they

interested in the integrated mills (those with

wood pulp supply on site or nearby) they had acquired in Maine in the Diamond
One of the first decisions James River managers made in Hyde Park was to shut
down the de-inking facilities. In a prospectus of the mill made available to potential buyers
when the plant came on the market three years later, James River attributed the decision
a virgin
deal.

"to the narrow cost of pulp and the cost of wastepaper" at the time.

De-inking and recycling had been standard procedure in the Hyde Park mill for decades.
During periods when the price of virgin pulp was running high, the de-inking equipment
ran at

full

capacity; as the price of pulp

allowed the plant to maximize

its

fell,

de-inking use slacked off. The machines also

pulp feedstock.

Any

scraps, trimmings, or wastepaper

generated in production could always be recycled.
Industry professionals estimate that only five or six paper mills in the United States are
currently manufacturing recycled paper

from de-inked wastepaper. The de-inking

13

mill
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nearest to

Hyde Park is

in

Miami, Ohio. Owing

to the

chemical processes involved and the

necessity to treat wastewater, the cost of de-inking and recycling paper had previously

been comparable with that of paper produced from virgin pulp. During the mid-eighties,
however, the price of virgin materials steadily increased, de-inking technologies improved, and

many

state

and federal

officials

became

interested in recycled paper procure-

ment. Recycling wastepaper was suddenly more economically viable than ever and
offered a partial solution to the nation's garbage glut.

James River began operations

in

Hyde Park with

a backlog of orders for heavyweight

paper (index card stock) that had been placed with Diamond. Following the

first six

more than
The union contract came up for renewal after eight months of work under the
new corporate owner. The Hyde Park mill had been a union shop since around the time of
World War JJ, with workers represented by Local 121 of the United Paperworkers Internamonths of operation, the mill reportedly exceeded James River's

profit targets

threefold.

tional

Union.

On July 1 1984, James River secured a three-year contract with union
who reported that in negotiation "everything went beautifully
there
,

paperworkers,

.

.

.

were no problems whatsoever."
Pay in the mill has historically been good. Production personnel typically work a three-

week cycle known
off, then

as a southern swing shift: seven days

seven days on with two days off, and

and midnight

on the job followed by one day

seven days on and four days

each passing week between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00

Shifts alternate with

night,

finally,

to

p.m,

4:00

off.

p.m. to

mid-

8:00 a.m. Workers accept the tough schedule because weekend

shifts bring premium pay or time and a half on Saturday and double time on Sunday. Shift
work and premium pay afford paperworkers a decent living
annual pay for Hyde Park

—

paperworkers averaged $33,000
that

among the prices they pay

in 1987. Still,

for shift

paperworkers are quick to acknowledge

work are schedules

that don't often

match those of

families and friends.

With only two medium-capacity fourdrinier papermaking machines on

now considered

small by industry standards. Daily production output

site,

the mill

is

when both ma-

chines are up and running has averaged 195 tons per day, with a combined annual production capacity in the range of sixty thousand tons.

James River began varying the Hyde

Park mill's product mix after the company met back orders for heavyweight paper. James
River management moved the mill's product concentration away from the card stock that

Diamond had been

selling in favor of communication papers to

mercial printers and book publishers in the

meet the needs of com-

New York and Boston areas.

Over the next three years the corporation invested considerable money on equipment in
the plant, including the installation of a paper analysis computer that automatically meas-

ures the ash content, opacity, and weight of newly formed paper. But the largest piece of

machinery

to

come

into the plant, a

complex $3.7 million project begun

in the

summer of

1987 and never fully operational, was a state-of-the-art computerized paper sheeting
(cutting)

the

system from West Germany. Paperworkers were excited about the potential of

new equipment,

figuring

it

would boost

outside paper to convert during periods

their efficiency

when

their

and allow the mill

to bring in

machines were down. James River had

up the exterior of the mill, planting shrubs and painting. Overall, the
was in good repair.
Union officials knew that the paper industry had been reckoning with increased prices
for pulp and energy supplies in recent years and that by 1987 their mill had not been profitable in many quarters. After a banner first year in fiscal 1984, James River had reportedly been posting consecutive losses at the mill. Production had dropped off at the plant
also been tidying

plant

14

by almost 25 percent

in fiscal years

1985 and 1986, with a corresponding drop

in sales

about 30 percent. 7 These figures accompanied James River's decision to pull out

Park sales force and centralize company operations out of

James River had not allowed the Hyde Park
equipment seemed

to

was regaining

its

of

Hyde

But despite tough times,

and the presence of new

mill to deteriorate,

be proof that the company was committed

to

Hyde Park operations

on April 26, 1987, there were signs that
past form: production and sales totals were approaching those of

over the long haul. At the close of
the mill

state.

its

its

fiscal year

although the new equipment expenditures would obviously cut into profits.

fiscal 1984,

When James River's

first

union contract came up for renegotiation

in July 1987,

was

it

The company's
proposal had eliminated the premium pay for Saturday and Sunday work. Union officials
were never willing to budge on the issue of premium pay, and one spokesperson labeled
the contract an attempt to "break the union." Union guidelines called for a ten-day negoquickly apparent to workers that the future of the plant was uncertain.

8

tiation period

with a provision to strike the day after

it

ended on July

17, 1987, if a con-

— with
—
walk
off
the
The
company
vowed
that
weekend pay
and voted instead to
job.
tract

was not signed. The

union refused the James River "final offer"

stoppage occurred, the mill would be shut down.

9

its

if

cuts in

a

work

Contract negotiations had broken

off,

but on July 16 the union was offered, and accepted, a ninety-day contract identical to that

of July

1

,

A strike was averted and the mill remained open — for the time being.

1983.

Following the aborted contract negotiations, James River began complaining publicly

was a money loser and announced

that the mill

by October 16 —

its

intent to sell the plant in ninety days

—

or shut down. Despite efforts to shift production from "commodity

paper grade to high return premium paper," according to a company spokesperson,
"efforts were thwarted" by a tight market, cost increases for materials, and the fact that

the mill

was nonintegrated. I0 The company made clear

contract negotiation tool and that

it

hundred workers, most of whom lived
job

at the time.

"Morale

is

longtime."'

The mood on

that the

proposed

was not a

sale

had every intention of leaving Hyde Park. Some two
in

Hyde Park, Dorchester, or Roxbury were on
was grim; a spokesperson

the shop floor

very, very low, particularly with the older

workers

.

.

.

for the

We've

all

the

union noted,

been here a

1

James River's commitment to
way it was
found
the oldest paper mill in the country up and running
appeared tenuous. A company spokesperson told a reporter, "We are actively looking for buyers and hoping that
the interested company will be a manufacturing firm that can continue employment opWhile workers were faced with an uncertain

future,

bringing in another paper manufacturer and leaving the community the

—

—

portunities for the workers ... It's

up

to the

buyer and whatever deal they can make."

EDIC Becomes Involved
The nonprofit Economic Development and

Industrial Corporation of Boston

(EDIC), one

of several quasi-public development agencies in the commonwealth, was established by
the city in 1971 to help Boston manufacturers initiate or expand industrial operations.

The

agency offers a wide range of development services, including the power to act as

banker

— issuing industrial development bonds or matching firms with state or federal
— broker, developer, and job trainer.

funding sources

James River's ultimatum

that

it

would close the plant

in three

new owner was

found, grabbed the attention of EDIC and a

the end of July,

EDIC

months, whether or not a

number of city

officials.

By

director Marilyn Swartz Lloyd convened a meeting with her staff,

15
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Hyde Park councillor Thomas Menino,
Matheson, and a James River

manager of the Hyde Park mill James
two hundred jobs was of
Swartz Lloyd came to the meeting prepared to put
resident

controller.

The

fate of the mill's

immediate concern to city officials.
James River in touch with professionals who could help with union negotiations, or to
discuss financing options available to stabilize the company's Hyde Park operations.

However, the company's decision had become a foregone conclusion: the corporation was
pulling out of Hyde Park regardless of any change in union position.

EDIC,

learning that

Kidder Peabody had been retained by James River to screen prospective buyers, contacted
the

on

company
its

to request copies of

own merit

any purchase proposals so that each could be evaluated

for retaining jobs.

Saving jobs in the Hyde Park community became the primary concern of many local
officials.

The city of Boston and local community had been stung by the recent $20 milHyde Park Westinghouse plant, which left one hundred people out of

lion sale of the

work. In response to speculative real estate pressures to purchase industrial space and
convert

it

more lucrative uses, such

to

working for months
to

to create

as office space or

an addition to the

city's

condominiums,

EDIC had been

zoning code. The new classification,

be designated Light Manufacturing Zone (LMZ), was intended

to protect existing

man-

ufacturing jobs and identify areas where "job-intensive light manufacturing operations"

could develop or expand.
for conversion to

LMZ zoning would prevent the sale of a manufacturing facility

nonmanufacturing uses.

EDIC would be

seeking approval for the

zoning category from the Boston Redevelopment Authority in the

fall

new

of 1987.

Hyde Park facility by October 16 left little time to
more than a year before federal plant-closing
legislation mandating a six-month notice became law). In an effort to gauge the mill's
James River's decision

secure the sale of the mill

viability,

tributors,

EDIC

to close the
(this

was

staff queried plant

and commercial

still

management, union representatives, local paper disEven though former customers expressed concern

printers.

that the quality of James River products

had been inconsistent

in recent years,

EDIC con-

cluded that a solid management team could iron out such problems and that the local busi-

Hyde Park mill. Late in the month of August,
EDIC's Swartz Lloyd wrote James River chief executive officer (CEO) Brenton Halsey
express concern that the October closing would force unrealistic consequences on mill
employees and to request that the company keep the mill open until a new buyer was
ness community was supportive of the

to

found.

On Monday, October 12, James River vice president of corporate planning Phillip
Henns announced that the company would postpone the October 16 closing of the mill
until mid- January. According to a James River spokesperson, it was "important to keep
Hyde Park open to allow the continued transfer of paper grades to other mills in the area
and to continue operating while trying to find another buyer." Workers in the mill agreed
to extend their original 1984 contract for a second three-month term. Henns also stated
that the company was considering two proposals put forward to purchase the mill: one
from the Massachusetts-based Cleer River Corporation, the other from the Conservatree
Paper Company of California. EDIC, in conjunction with Kidder Peabody, was working
12

13

purchase with industrial revenue bonds and, according to Swartz Lloyd, "a

to finance a

local

company

to succeed."

tied to a local market, as

opposed

to a national

market [had] a good chance

14

— to continue making
— but each was radically different in means. Conservatree president

Both these early proposals were concerned with the same end
paper in Hyde Park

Alan Davis

first

met with James River's

Phillip

16

Henns

in

October and

later submitted a

letter

of intent to purchase the mill dated

December 23, 1987. Davis's proposal was based

on what he believed was the mill's unique asset
sary to

— the on-site de-inking equipment neces-

produce recycled paper products. The other proposal was from Joseph Ardini, a

former Hyde Park mill worker, president of Cleer River

in Centerville,

Massachusetts.

Ardini's business plan reportedly stated his intent to run the plant as a "virgin" mill,

making paper from wood pulp without the benefit of the de-inking facilities.
Ardini had worked for many years at the Hyde Park mill. At one time there were
be four Ardini brothers working

owned by

in the plant, dating

back

to the fifties

when

said to

the mill

was

Tileston and Hollingsworth. At the time he left in the mid-seventies, Joseph

Ardini had worked his way up to mill manager. Union officers didn't see him again

until

1987, although he had a reputation for having opened and subsequently closed two paper
mills in the interim.
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Then,

in late 1987, reportedly

EDIC

backed

in part

by foreign investors,

American Development Finance Corporation (ADF) to apply toward the purchase price of the mill. The
Ardini application was pending approval in mid-December.
Because the James River Corporation was pulling out of Hyde Park on the basis of its
assertion that the plant was not profitable as a virgin mill, it struck Conservatree owner
Alan Davis as ironic that a former plant manager would come up with a proposal to buy
the mill for precisely the same type of operation. At a meeting with EDIC officials attended by Rob Bauman, Mayor Flynn's environmental affairs adviser, Ardini claimed that
the plant would succeed only as a virgin mill. Further, Ardini chastised "the environmenArdini filed an application sponsored by

talists" in the

room

for their youthful naivete

was economically viable

Bauman had given

in

Hyde

for financing with the

and

flatly

dismissed the notion that recycling

Park.

considerable thought to the economics of operating the mill and

concluded that the de-inking equipment was the plant's most important

working hard

to sell

EDIC on the concept of recycling

asset.

He was

also

while explaining the role the Hyde

But Bauman found it hard to argue with someone who had
The Ardini business plan had given development officials
reason to believe that recycling wasn't viable in Hyde Park. For a time it appeared that the
Ardini proposal would meet the requirements for ADF program financing and James
River's asking price. Rumors swirling around the mill were that a sale was imminent. The

Park mill could play
actually

worked

locally.

in the mill.

company's finances, however, were not completely
tion

in order. After a

Cleer River Corpora-

check was rumored to have been presented against insufficient funds, the company's

proposal was withdrawn.
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Conservatree 's plan to revitalize the mill's de-inking equipment and manufacture paper

from recycled feedstock represented what some public

officials believed to

be the best

environmental use of the mill: to manufacture paper from the city's wastepaper and simultaneously begin to address Boston's mounting solid waste disposal problems.

Rob

Bauman was the most articulate advocate to emerge from the early EDIC meetings and
lobby for renewing recycling operations in the mill. Bauman had set up pilot recycling
projects around the
fill

city,

an important void

cling's long-term

as well as in City Hall,

and quickly understood

in the local recycling puzzle.

economic

viability,

that the mill could

Bauman was aware that to

new markets had to be developed

to

secure recy-

absorb the

in-

creasing supplies of paper, metal, and glass collected through developing municipal and

commercial recycling programs.
Recycling planners are quick to concede that successful recycling ventures must be built
with an economy of scale which ensures that collection strategies, processing centers, and

markets are part of an integrated whole. Implementing a full-scale recycling operation

17
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the

Hyde Park mill would create steady demand

for a large supply of locally generated

wastepaper, a vital link in any local recycling program. Boston area real estate values

combined with neighborhood concerns associated with new development make the siting
of another paper mill within city limits unlikely. But without new industrial capacity to
absorb recyclable feedstocks, Bauman's recycling initiatives could easily fail
a scenario
with potential to cripple future recycling programs in the city.

—

The Conservatree Plan
Conservatree president Alan Davis
tions with

first

learned of the

James River had broken down, and he came

September 1987. Davis founded Conservatree

in

Hyde Park mill
to

Boston

after

union negotia-

to see the facility in

1977 after leaving his job as an attorney

with an environmental foundation. In ten years his company had become the largest

wholesale distributor of recycled printing and writing paper in the United States. With
sales nearing

$8 million

growing companies

in 1987,

Conservatree had

made

in three of the previous four years.

able in large part to Davis's efforts to stimulate market
ucts, particularly in the public sector.

Oregon

California and

recycled paper.

that

the Inc.

Record

demand

The company was

magazine

sales

list

of fastest

growth was

for recycled

attribut-

paper prod-

largely responsible for laws in

extend state procurement preferences for the purchase of

17

Conservatree was also quick to tout the environmental benefits resulting from the manufacture of recycled paper. Having sold
its

more than 36,000

inception, Conservatree translated that

350,000

trees,

from

landfills; a reduction in air pollution effluents of

746

tons;

in taxes saved.

The Hyde Park mill presented an ideal opportunity
to

into savings of more than

108,424 kilowatt-hours of electricity, 180 million gallons of water, 14,000

tons of waste diverted

and $566,588

tons of recycled products since

volume of material

for Davis to create a

new company

manufacture the products Conservatree had been so successfully marketing. The heart

of Davis's business plan was recycling:

"The Hyde Park mill

will

be historically

signifi-

cant, both as the paper mill with the longest record of continuous operations in the U.S.

and as the

first mill to

completely integrate the

full cycle

of the recycling concept, from

waste supply to marketing programs." The primary components of the Conservatree plan
for the

Hyde Park mill

included:

• Revitalizing the mill's de-inking

equipment

to allow the plant to process

high-grade wastepaper bought from commercial brokers; and to later up-

grade de-inking

facilities to

accept low-grade wastepaper with the under-

standing that this paper would be available in quantity from a proposed

Boston materials recovery
•

facility at

low

cost.

Reducing energy costs associated with paper manufacturing by
electrical cogeneration

installing

equipment capable of meeting the mill's energy

needs and generating revenue by selling surplus electricity to Boston Edison.

management and streamlining production in an effort to
maximize productivity; creating an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)
extending workers 30 percent plant ownership and representation on the

• Restructuring

executive board with veto power over investment decisions.

18

The ESOP

would be financed through employee payroll deductions approximating
$5,000 per worker.
Marketing activity directed

•

(to

at creating a

niche for the mill's recycled paper

be the only such producer of recycled printing and writing paper

in the

Northeast) drawn from an internal sales group and existing Conservatree
distribution channels.

Davis knew that the Hyde Park plant had great potential as a recycled-paper mill and
that

it

presented a formidable financial challenge. The Conservatree business plan was

premised on the notion that the mill could be acquired before James River shut down
operations.

Once

the plant

was

idle

and boilers were turned

off, pipes

would begin

to

corrode. Davis estimated that rehabilitating equipment after a shutdown would add $ 1
million to start-up costs. Another important consideration for keeping the mill open had to

Once the mill was down for a prolonged period, any new owner would risk
work force, and skilled paperworkers are a scarce commodity in the Boston
labor market. Davis's operational priority was to get in the mill before it was mothballed,
but should the mill have closed, he believed, James River must assume responsibility for
do with

labor.

losing the old

absorbing start-up costs.

Davis made his pitch for the mill before an employees' meeting on November 21 and

December 20, 1987. At those gatherings Davis

again at a union meeting on

vision for the mill by explaining the

would be back on the job,

that

illustrated his

ESOP while projecting that two hundred workers

$2 million would be invested to revitalize the plant, and that

a planned materials-recovery facility could supply 60 percent of the mill's furnish.

scope of the Conservatree plan
quickly

warmed up

sounded a
been a

little

initially

The

caught union members by surprise, but they

"When Davis came on the scene, even though it
we thought maybe he had something here ... It would have

to the proposal:

farfetched,

fantastic deal for us in the long run."

Davis's

offer to

initial

James River was rumored

to

be

in the

neighborhood of $5-$6

million, far short of James River's asking price of approximately $15 million. That figure

was regarded by Davis to be oriented to the company's book value for the mill, rather than
a fair market appraisal; at auction he estimated the mill would sell for $3.5-$4 million.
Alan Davis had won the support of Hyde Park paperworkers for his plan. The task before him was to try to convince James River to accept what he considered to be a fair
offer. In effect,

Davis was hoping to acquire the mill the same way Halsey and Williams

had built the James River company. "Our job
bers in January, "is to

make

it

clear to

in the next

James River

few days," he wrote union

that selling the

Hyde Park mill

mem-

to

its

employees and Conservatree has significance, and the potential to generate tremendous
goodwill for James River, that far outweighs the dollars that keep us from reaching agree-

ment. Moreover, their decision to walk away from the Hyde Park mill will have negative
public relations consequences which makes that decision even

River never formally responded to

this first

more uneconomic." James

Conservatree offer and the bid subsequently

expired.

Oldest U.S. Paper Mill Closed

On December
of paper in

18, 1987, the

Hyde

Park.

James River Corporation appeared

The company closed

to have

made

its last roll

the plant for the holidays and later negotiated
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a three- week severance agreement with the union. Staff at

EDIC who were monitoring

James River's progress in selling the mill had begun to grow concerned that the company
was not doing all it might to "solicit good prospective buyers." These concerns must
certainly have

been exacerbated after the mill was closed and workers were off the job.

In an effort to evaluate the mill's potential as a full-scale recycling operation,

EDIC

commissioned a study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL), the Cambridge consulting firm.
EDIC also collaborated on an additional study contracted to the Industrial Cooperative

The ICA evaluated two options

Association (ICA) of Somerville.

for

worker ownership

in

the mill: the feasibility of a 100 percent worker buyout, and the Conservatree 30 percent
joint ownership plan.

additional funding
If

Rob Bauman

felt

mill collapsed, the

The ICA study was paid

from EDIC and the

by the union's international office with

for

state's Industrial Services

professionally vindicated

when

Program

(ISP).

the Ardini proposal to acquire the

ADL study confirmed his belief that revitalizing the mill's de-inking

equipment and manufacturing high-grade recycled paper was economically viable: "The
report showed that marketwise you could seize a really nice niche selling that paper and
the mill

was

set

up

do

to

sioned a study of his

that

own

.

.

.

The de-inking was

in early

the critical link."

Bauman commis-

January that was performed by Anne Scheinberg, a

recycling consultant, to critique the economics of the Conservatree business plan and
potential impact

on the development of recycling

in Boston.

The

its

report supported the

Conservatree recycling plan in concept but raised questions regarding

its

implementation,

including:
• the

importance of continuity in technical management

• the disposal of effluent

at the mill;

and sludge generated by the de-inking equipment;

• the ability of the city or state to generate a reliable supply of wastepaper;

and
• inadequate state

procurement policies

government marketing

It

was up

to

efforts in the

that could inhibit Conservatree 's

commonwealth.

Conservatree to fine-tune the technical considerations of these concerns,

while the state's participation was a matter of existing legislation and policies outlined in
the Solid Waste Act of 1987.

The Role of Recycling

in a Solid

Waste Master Plan

In addition to a prolonged state fiscal imbroglio precipitated by falling tax revenues, an

economic slowdown, and neglect, Massachusetts

is

reckoning with severe environmental

sites, the infamous Boston Harbor, and
volume of trash generated in the commonwealth each year at 6.1 million tons. Of this, only 7 percent was recycled in 1988
attributable largely to the bottle bill; 31 percent was burned in private incinerators and

problems, including hundreds of hazardous waste
a solid waste disposal "crisis." Estimates peg the

waste-to-energy

By

—

and the remaining 62 percent was landfilled in and out of state.
amount of municipal waste generated in the commonwealth is ex-

facilities,

the year 2000, the

pected to top 7 million tons a year. 18
In 1988, Massachusetts landfills could

accommodate only 3.4 million tons of trash and
The prognosis for the immediate future

nearly one million tons were trucked out of state.
is

alarming: by 1996 most of the municipal landfills
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now

in operation will

be closed. To

help

make up

the difference in lost disposal capacity, the state

is

looking toward incinera-

tion and recycling. Incineration capacity grew to 48 percent in 1990, with more likely to
be added. The Department of Environmental Protection has estimated that even with a 10
percent reduction in waste, and with recycling and composting projected to absorb 34

percent of the waste stream in 1996, the state

faces an 8 percent landfill capacity

still

shortfall in 1992, with the potential to rise to 12 percent

by 2000. Such

statistics point to

the realization that there are no easy or cheap remedies for the disposal debacle

now con-

commonwealth.
In 1985 Governor Michael Dukakis and Secretary of Environmental Affairs James S.
Hoyte issued a report entitled A Solid Waste Plan for Massachusetts. That study outlined
goal to adopt a "50-25-25" disposal scheme in the commonwealth by incinerating 50
percent of all solid waste, recycling 25 percent, and landfilling 25 percent. Proclaiming
fronting the

that "this is the year of the

environment

.

.

.

this state's

a

economy depends on a clean and
December 1987.

healthy environment," Governor Dukakis signed the Solid Waste Act in

This legislation was intended to put some muscle into efforts to combat the disposal crisis

by allocating funds

to close leaking landfills,

open safe

landfills

and incinerators, and by

charging the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering

(DEQE)

with a mandate

an integrated solid waste master plan for the commonwealth. Toward that end, the

to draft

$260 million package appropriated funding
velopment of five or

six regional

for

immediate action

resource recovery

was

to include de-

landfills

and the astro-

that

facilities.

Given the pollution and storage concerns associated with town

nomical costs associated with cleanup, municipalities will be hard pressed
their disposal

problems independently

regional recycling

to

cope with

The unique characteristic of the

in the years ahead.

program in the Solid Waste Act is that it charted a regional approach
The essence of the program was to redirect a portion of the solid

to

solid waste disposal.

waste stream back to materials production and thereby reduce the quantity of material to

be disposed

of.

To implement

this

concept the state would construct a regional network of

materials recovery facilities (MRFs). These could serve populations of up to 450,000,

functioning as large-scale collection and sorting facilities for glass, metal, paper, and
plastic.

among

As

outlined in the Solid Waste Act,

MRFs represent a three-way partnership

participating communities, private contractors,

and the

state to forge a materials

recovery infrastructure.
Six

MRFs were planned in the first phase of the statewide program,

with twelve plants

projected to be operational by the end of the century. 19 Each facility would be designed to
recycle

up

to

50,000 tons of materials per

year.

Operating

would process 300,000 tons of materials per year; twelve
tons

— approximately 10 percent of

scaled back plans to build the

all

at full capacity, six

MRFs

MRFs would handle 600,000

waste generated in the

MRFs. The first draft of the

state.

The

DEQE has since

solid waste master plan (one of

three requested by the legislature, to be accompanied by one year of review and public
dialogue), released by the agency in

December 1988,

called for only three

MRFs:

in

Springfield, Cambridge, and Boston.

The commonwealth's regional
is

recycling plan has served as a

model

for other states

and

being successfully duplicated in Connecticut and Rhode Island. But the implementation

of the program in Massachusetts has been prone to criticism. The
facility, slated for

on

line until

first

materials recovery

Springfield, was to be operational by the spring of 1988 but didn't

January of 1990.

A Boston Globe editorial of February 3,

mixed signals, abrupt turns,
Optimism about regional recycling

ized the state's solid waste policies as "half-baked ideas,

missed opportunities and the failure to produce

21

.

.

.

come

1988, character-
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centers (and the promise of one for the Springfield area by year's end)

merely talk

is

in

the absence of a marketing strategy for the products of these centers."

The Conservatree business plan
equipment with the assumption

called for reactivating the

Hyde Park mill's de-inking

that a state- or city-operated materials recovery facility

would ensure a steady supply of wastepaper. Alan Davis expected

that

MRF-supplied

wastepaper could be purchased for approximately $30 per ton, a price well below market
value for high-grade "brokered" wastepaper (office and computer paper collected from

cooperating businesses by private firms).

But with the
ton

state well

behind schedule on the regional recycling program and no Bos-

MRF on the immediate horizon, Conservatree could not bank on any MRF-supplied
Hyde Park mill might well

wastepaper. However, the Scheinberg study concluded that the

develop wastepaper supplies from the very businesses to which
cled papers

it

hoped

to

market recy-

— at a cost equal to or below the $30 per ton budgeted. Such a plan would

effectively create a closed recycling loop

between waste supplies, remanufacture, and a

secured market, a concept symbolized in the three interlocking arrows that form the universal recycling logo.

These three components are the essence of any viable recycling

operation.

Local 121 Organizes to Save the Mill

much talk of fighting the James River plant closing
among its workers. Following the December 1987 shutdown and severance agreement,
Hyde Park paperworkers were on their own (some participated in job retraining programs
In the beginning there hadn't been

set up by the state's Industrial Services Program while others waited and hoped the mill
would reopen). James River was also downplaying the idea that the mill would ever pro-

duce again. At the close of 1987 a company

would never reopen and
protest and find

that

it

was

official told

Local 121 's international representative had been

Top

commit union resources

of the mill and

drop any idea of a plant-closing

new jobs.

quarters, as had Alan Davis.

sion to

union members that the plant

in their best interest to

its

jobs.

in contact

with international head-

officials at the international subsequently

to the

Hyde Park

local in

an effort

made

a deci-

to secure the livelihood

A veteran union organizer from New Bedford,

Ron Carver, was

campaign to save the mill. With many years'
experience as a union representative and planner of numerous plant-closing campaigns,
Carver may be best known for orchestrating a multiyear effort to prevent a closing of New
Bedford's Morse Tool Company in the early to middle eighties. The Morse Tool camenlisted to help the paperworkers develop a

paign proved that a union could successfully fight a parent company's claim that local
operations were not viable and further demonstrated that a corporate parent could be held

accountable for the future well-being of its plant.

There are many remarkable similarities between the Hyde Park paper mill and the
Morse Tool plant. Each is more than a century old and had passed from generations of
family ownership to large corporate interests in recent years. When profits lagged, man-

agement

in

both plants had asked their unions to concede to wholesale salary and benefit

win major concessions, and perhaps inevitably, management at each facilwarned of an imminent sale or plant closing, a pattern characteristic of the ongoing

cuts. Failing to
ity

phenomenon of deindustrialization among America's aging
tain future, state

revitalize the

industries.

economic development assistance would be necessary

Morse Tool Company and the Hyde Park mill.
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Given the uncerin

proposals to

As

a result of his organizing the

Morse Tool union, Ron Carver had consummate

knowledge of the machinations of Massachusetts 's economic development agencies. He
came to Hyde Park in February 1988 and revived a theme that had been the lifeblood of

Morse Tool campaign: this was not an anonymous factory that was closing, but a vital
resource — a "community institution" and bastion of "good jobs and good wages" for
generations. As he had in New Bedford, Carver was preparing the Hyde Park union to
the

fight the plant closing

on a "moral,

if

not legal" foundation.

While Hyde Park union members had been

in contact

prior to the mill closing, the local had begun to lose

River officials believed that the

and

to

James River's claim

members had

that the plant

in fact resigned

was not

profitable.

members of the Hyde Park local, Carver outlined
and

their

his

New

and James

At his

first

meeting with

"bottom line" belief that "unions

Bedford, he said, the union had proved that while

were continually reinvesting

city

themselves to the closure

communities should be highly skeptical of an owner's view

viable." In
tors

with city officials in the months

momentum. Some

in operations, their facility

that a plant is not

many of their competi-

had been allowed

to lag far

behind and become outmoded. In Hyde Park, the union never understood James River's
rationale for shutting

pany was using

down the de-inking equipment and

this mill as a training

Carver told the union,

ity,

is

ground

for rookie

in recent years felt that the

com-

managers and executives. Viabil-

influenced by management decisions beyond the short-term

scope of quarterly earnings and annual profits.

Carver was also concerned, as were many
everything within

its

power

to

come

to

city officials, that

James River was not doing

terms with potential buyers for the mill.

Carver explained, "was raise the stakes so

"What we

would be more advantageous
Our campaign was based on the proposition that James
for James River to get rid of it
River should cut the best deal they could and do it quickly while the plant remained viable
and the workforce reasonably intact." The ultimate fate of the mill, Carver believed,
could be influenced by the union but would depend on the members' willingness to work
had

to do,"

.

for

it.

The

local's

.

that

it

.

commitment early

in the winter of

1988 appeared

tentative.

Following

the first organizational meeting with Carver, the local's president and vice president

never returned. (The president reportedly
job.) Local leadership

had

more than seventeen years

to

be

left the

totally rebuilt.

in the mill,

area and the vice president took another

John Connolly and Matie Shiel, each with

were elected president and

treasurer, respectively,

and Joanne Gaines, with eight years' experience, was elected sergeant

at

arms.

At a State House reception on February 19, ten days before the Maine presidential
caucus, Governor Michael Dukakis signed a proclamation presented by the Jay, Maine,
United Paperworkers International Union endorsing their "struggle for jusThe governor was introduced at the gathering by state secretary of labor Paul Eus-

local of the
tice."

on his White
House agenda. Members of the Hyde Park local were no doubt counting on the governor's
support for their agenda to reopen the Hyde Park mill. Despite repeated attempts, including letters and telegrams of support sent from union leaders around the country, the Hyde
Park paperworkers were never able to meet with the governor.

tace as "a friend of labor" and a presidential candidate with organized labor

Conservatree Rallies Support
Conservatree was in the news again following a Hyde Park community meeting on February 29 to discuss the environmental concerns associated with the company's de-inking

and recycling intentions. Former plant workers arrived
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at the

packed meeting with green
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and white ribbons pinned

to their chests.

Alan Davis received enthusiastic support from

workers and responded to concerns from neighbors regarding the plant's potential impact

on the

local

A former plant engineer and de-inking expert, who had been

community.

hired as a technical consultant by Conservatree, explained Davis's plan to build a state-of-

While Conservatree made clear
welcome former workers back to the mill, city
realization that "there is no deal on the table, no

the-art effluent treatment plant to deal with wastewater.
its

eagerness to implement

officials

its

plans and

tempered the meeting with the

20
purchase and sale agreement between the two companies."

It

was nearly three months since Conservatree 's first bid to James River had been prewas reportedly in the range of $8 million. James River,

sented, and Davis's latest offer

meanwhile, dropped
sector appraisers

its

asking price for the mill to $11 million, a figure

still felt

was

some private-

unrealistic, given the costs associated with restarting the

facility.

Conservatree was looking to the state for a loan guarantee and for a commitment to help
influence James River to

development

sell.

business plan and reduced
million. Davis

once the

state

By

this time, following

staff and financial consultants,
its state

many

discussions with economic

Conservatree had refined

its

Hyde Park

loan guarantee requirement to approximately $4.5

had also identified private sources willing

upward of $15 million

to finance

guarantee was in place. Conservatree' s total financial package was in excess

of $20 million and included capital to overhaul and upgrade de-inking equipment in addition to

money needed to build the cogeneration plant and

offset start-up operating losses.

economic development staff agreed that Conservatree 's plans for worker ownership and the environmental benefits associated with recycling were commendable, but the
package as a whole was considered financially risky and called for "extraordinary" state
State

participation.

Compared to

workers, some

felt that

similar proposals, such as that

made by

"a disproportionate share of the risk"

the Quincy Shipyard

in the

Conservatree busi-

ness plan would be carried by the state and that " [Conservatree] needed to find ways to

share the risk." Rebecca Callahan, a regional coordinator in the state's economic develop-

ment

office, estimated that the state

would have been able

to provide $1

loan guarantees, but that was "stretching our authority as far as

paper account quoted a

state official as saying that the

company of Conservatree' s

we

.5-$2 million in

could."

One news-

venture might be too large for a

size ($8 million in sales the previous year).

Conservatree was also asking the state for political support to help leverage sale of the
mill

from James

River. This request proved

guarantee, and

many development officials

More than one

staff person

acknowledged

much more
clearly

that

it

difficult to quantify than a loan

were not comfortable with the

was not their job

to pick winners

idea.

and

losers but to help arrange financing.

Conservatree believed, and the union concurred, that
for the mill

and that James River was obligated

to the

its

plan was the best to be offered

workers and community

to sell to a

buyer that would carry on the business of paper manufacturing while the plant was

still

operable. But James River appeared to be in no big hurry to cut a deal with Conservatree.

Several people involved with the ongoing negotiations speculated privately that because

of Davis's aggressive tactics, James River "wouldn't have sold to Conservatree in a

hundred years."
It's

also quite possible that

where

to devote

much

James River was simply too preoccupied with business elseHyde Park and the expedient sale of the mill. Through-

attention to

out fiscal 1988 James River had been rapidly increasing
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its

manufacturing presence

in the

European marketplace: acquiring a 50 percent interest in a French paper company, forming a joint venture in Sweden, purchasing two mills in the United Kingdom and a small

weeks before a lease for the mill was
ultimately signed, the company's net income had jumped 23 percent and annual sales

plant in Ireland. At the close of that year, just

cracked $5 billion for the

first time.

Appeals to Governor Dukakis
While work was under way
ments for a

to best craft the

state loan guarantee, efforts to

James River

intensified.

to focus attention

Conservatree business plan to meet require-

win

support and leverage a sale from

political

On Thursday, March 3, Alan Davis elevated the public campaign

on the mill a notch when he delivered an "open

letter" to

Governor

Dukakis's office requesting the governor's "personal intervention in a project which will
have significant benefits to the economy, environment and people of Massachusetts." The
letter read, in part:

Without your leadership, Conservatree Paper Company's plan to reopen the Hyde Park
mill and put over

two hundred employees back

to

work transforming up

20 percent

to

of Boston's trash into printing paper will not reach fruition. Though considerable
union, financial, technical and community support

become bogged down due

to a lack of leadership

If this project is to reach fruition,
1

is

already in place, the project has

from

state officials.

your immediate, direct assistance

Help persuade the James River Corporation

is vital to:

to sell the plant at a fair

market

price.
2.

Obtain

3.

Expeditious, but thorough, processing of our permit applications relating to

a
4.

state

loan guarantees necessary to leverage private financing.

new cogeneration

facility

and authorizations

paper mill.

to operate a

A state procurement policy which establishes a preference for purchasing
recycled paper. Massachusetts

years behind

State assistance to this project

wealth and

its

is

twelve years behind California and eight

New York in establishing

citizens

who

is

such procedures.

crucial and warranted because

will reap the environmental

five months, Conservatree has sought help

have received no tangible support.

It is

it

is

the

Common-

and economic benefits. For

from a variety of state agencies. As

not clear

who

is

yet,

we

in charge of helping launch a

valuable project like this one, what resources are available to aid

it,

or even

if there is

a

coherent state policy dealing with recycling.

Governor,

this is a perfect

The letter was released

at a

opportunity to demonstrate your leadership.

Parker House press conference later that day. Speaking to the

press, Davis estimated that "even though state loan guarantees should never be tapped,

the state's

commitment

will

produce a payoff of over four million dollars annually

avoided waste disposal costs."

in

A spokesman for the union then announced plans to initiate

sell the mill. The laid-of f paperworkers would soon be
unemployment benefits, and Davis was increasingly concerned that
former employees would begin to scatter and seek jobs elsewhere.
On Saturday, March 5, a Boston Globe editorial charged that "the administration has
done little to help the [Conservatree] plan become reality." The column singled out Duka-

a petition calling on James River to
losing their extended
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kis

economics adviser Alden Raine and urged the Dukakis administration

James River

to sell the plant to a

The editorial concluded

buyer that

that "the

While Davis had been working

is

best able to set

key element

is

to "encourage
up the recycling operation."

recycling."

up a loan guarantee with the

to line

state, there

were

among a few city officials regarding leverage the city could bring
to bear on James River. One such option concerned the possibility of the city's taking the
Hyde Park mill by eminent domain. Talk of such a procedure had previously come up in
exploratory discussions

City Hall

— most recently with regard to the Colonial meat-packing plant in South Boston

to pursue the Colonial plant on the advice of legal counsel, a deciwas reached with ideological rather than legal precedent).
A classic example of the use of eminent domain being threatened can be found in New
Bedford. The Morse Tool Company's absentee corporate parent had indicated that the
company would be forced to close the facility and sell to a buyer that might liquidate its
assets. The mayor of New Bedford countered that the city was prepared in that case to take

(the city later

sion

some

chose not

felt

domain and sell it to a buyer who was committed to manufacturing.
The company subsequently chose to keep the plant operational while continuing to look
the plant by eminent

for

an appropriate buyer.

An eminent domain procedure would have allowed the city of Boston to exercise its
bonding authority

to raise capital for the

of fair market value.

purchase of the mill

The plant could then be

at a price

determined to be

leased to an operator and the city might

provide additional support by stabilizing taxes on the property until the operation was
viable.

was estimated

It

that use of city

bonds would pose

burden

little

to taxpayers (ap-

proximately $100,000 a year), although development staff were divided on the issue. But
as

months dragged on and the plant remained closed, top

plans to initiate an eminent

city officials

were reviewing

domain purchase.

Don't Kill the Mill

Ron Carver was
Politically,

skeptical of the city's

he figured,

what he considered

to

was too

it

commitment

sensitive

an

be a reasonable (and

issue.

to seize the mill

by eminent domain.

However, Carver had come up with

politically

much less delicate)

rather than pursue eminent domain, city resources (specifically

spent shaping the Conservatree business plan. Carver proposed that

Arthur D.

Little, this

its

want

Having seen buyers

members

felt that

dependence on

to

its

again employ

work with

state loan guarantees.

The union, Carver

a buyer that didn't promise financial stability.

for the mill surface in past

months only

to fall

by the wayside, union

any business plan that came forward would need refining, that none would

be perfect. Development
about

EDIC

time to rework the Conservatree business plan with an eye toward

easing or eliminating
stressed, did not

alternative:

EDIC's) would be better

EDIC contended that any prospective owner serious
own money in its own business plan. An investment of the

officials at

bid should invest

its

nature Carver was proposing appeared to be without precedent at

EDIC, and was probably

all, most of the talk
domain seemed to be coming from City Hall, not EDIC.
Despite this stalemate, support for the paperworkers emerged from some very unlikely
sources. Following a profile of the Hyde Park closing on public television's Channel 2
news, the securities firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert contacted the union with an interest
in helping finance the proposed Conservatree ESOP. Although Drexel is best known for

never considered as a low-profile alternative to eminent domain. After
involving the use of eminent
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its

junk bond transactions, the firm also had a reputation for working

to

develop employee

ownership deals, including the plan put together by the Quincy shipbuilders to reopen
their shipyard. Drexel's involvement

made

the overall Conservatree proposal

"more

EDIC and Carver remained at odds over the

tractive" to development officials, but

of contracting a consulting group to refine the Conservatree business plan

at-

issue

at the city's

expense.

With the passing of the ides of March the union stepped up

its Don't Kill the Mill camowner that would continue
Ron Carver had charged that James River would prefer

paign. Efforts to pressure James River to

manufacturing paper intensified.

the mill to an

sell

to sell the plant as a general industrial property rather than pass

along to another paper

it

manufacturer that would ultimately be competing in the specialty papers marketplace with
other James River mills. Avoiding competition with a future

owner was a concern James

River previously had raised with regard to the theoretical framework for a 100 percent

employee buyout. The company had said

it

was willing

to consider such an option only if

company's leading prod-

the workers would agree not to produce text and cover paper, the

The

ucts, for a five-year period.

the

rationale for such an

Hyde Park mill's manufacturing

agreement

is

enigmatic, given that

capacity represented only a tiny fraction of James

River's total output.

On Tuesday, March 22,

Senator William Keating submitted a resolution to the Massa-

James River

chusetts Senate urging

to

"reach a timely sale

potential buyer able to provide the mill workers

ployee-owned recycling mill

at

.

.

.

the

and the

at fair

market value with any

city of Boston

Hyde Park location." By

with such an em-

the company's

count, James River didn't have any offers on the table at that time

own ac-

— a Conservatree bid

could not be officially tendered until the state guarantee was in place, although James
River certainly was aware of Conservatree 's intent. Union officials were adamant that

James River was

stalling

"The company has a

just like water, just like

leave

it

and insisted

that the

company was

obligated to facilitate a sale:

community resource,
community resource with respect and

social responsibility to treat the mill just like a
air.

just as they found

They have

to treat this

it."

Less than one week later the Boston City Council passed a resolution urging the James

EDIC and the state's Economic Development Office to assist any interested parties. City Councillor Rosaria Salerno went one step further and wrote James River CEO Brenton Halsey to "strongly
River Corporation to negotiate with potential buyers and for

support this Resolution and urge that James River negotiate the sale of the
to Conservatree

for

some time,

tree

Hyde Park mill

Paper Company." Salerno maintained that the mill had been on the market

that Conservatree

was committed

to the

remained interested

believe the City of Boston should use the resources at
sale of the mill to Conservatree.

the City Council to

Thus

I

to

its

its

will continue to

become more involved in

The union planned
to build support for

in the purchase,

union as well as to recycling. The

letter

at

that

Conserva-

disposal to assist in the equitable

urge

and members of
Hyde Park mill."

city officials

efforts to reopen the

launch a petition drive

and

concluded, "I also

a City Hall press conference on April 5

campaign. At that press conference, flanked by a garbage truck

with a banner that read "Don't Kill the Mill! " and "Save

Good Clean Jobs,"

began collecting thousands of signatures. The petition was coordinated

the union

to call attention to

the unresolved future of mill jobs and to promote the Conservatree plan as the best solution for saving jobs

and recycling paper. The

first

Mayor Raymond Flynn.
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signature on the petition was that of
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Union

officials

were naturally frustrated

that not all public officials

right with their support for the union/Conservatree

been.

Some of this

frustration turned to anger

when

could be as forth-

package as Councillor Salerno had
it

was learned that during the

top state labor official had taken a city employee aside and suggested that
to exercise caution with

union involvement.

were looking

and

at the mill

that

It

was intimated

it

rally a

would be wise

that other potential buyers

Conservatree was not the only game in town. Why, union

members wondered, would a high-ranking labor official fail to throw solid support behind
what they regarded as their best option? The offhand remark was viewed contemptuously
by the union as an attempt
In a

to "scuttle the

news story covering the

turned off the mill's boilers a

plumbing was prone

whole damn thing."
it was reported

rally that evening,

week earlier. With

to corrosion,

that

James River had

the heating system down, the mill's

and future start-up costs would begin

to

mount. The

union campaign pressed on with a new sense of urgency.

Communication Breakthrough
The days and weeks following the City Hall rally were again marked by intense activity on
many fronts. State Representative Angelo Scaccia was instrumental in convening a meeting with union officials, Alan Davis, Alden Raine, and economic affairs secretary Joseph
Alviani. At that meeting, Secretary Alviani appeared concerned and surprised that the
state

had been slow

to

respond and asked Raine to put together a task force

to

work on

the

Conservatree plan. Carver had earlier approached the Industrial Services Program for
support, only to learn that ISP was juggling

many

projects at the time and couldn't dedi-

cate a staff member to the project. But following the formation of Alviani's task force,

one of the agency's leading

The

task force then

staff members

to the Hyde Park case.
some of the "difficult assump-

was assigned

met with Alan Davis

to flesh out

tions" that were incorporated into Conservatree' s bottom line. These included the availability of state-supplied wastepaper, bringing

cogeneration

facilities

on

line,

and market

conditions for paper.
In a follow-up letter to

Alden Raine, Davis pointed out that the

first

two assumptions

concerning wastepaper availability and cogeneration permitting were largely within
control.

With regard

to the

paper market, Davis emphasized that

"we are today

state

in the best

paper market in history, and prices are already 5 to 10 percent higher than they were

at the

Nobody can predict what the market will be like in 1989 or 1990,
but we do know that we are ahead of the game ... I might be so bold as to suggest that
beginning of the year.
there are few

if

any economic development projects that present such an opportunity:

maintenance of industrial jobs; employee ownership; clean energy production; and a

worldwide model

for alleviating the solid waste problem.

And all of this can likely be

achieved at no cost to the taxpapers of Massachusetts."
In early

May, Conservatree submitted

Union Message Delivered

its

final offer.

in Virginia

After weeks spent gathering signatures in support of its effort, the union delivered

its

James River: large advertisements were purchased in the two newspapers of the
company's hometown, Richmond, Virginia, on May 3. The ads were crafted as an open

petition to

letter to

James River

CEO Brenton Halsey and president Robert Williams, urging them to

expedite the sale of the mill and leave the

Hyde Park community
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the

way they found

it:

Four years ago, James River Corporation bought the
doors.

We

mill.

This January you locked the

you can close

realize that legally, as suits your business needs,

up, or tear

it

it,

board

it

down.

But the mill

an important economic resource for our community.

is

friends, neighbors,

who were

and relatives

see the social costs of plant closings

Sometimes these tragedies are

put out of work.

We know

And

it's

our

the victims;

we

— broken families, substance abuse, and despair.
But in

inevitable.

this case there is hope.

account, other companies have indicated that our mill could

fit

By your own

into their future.

They

have proposed reopening the mill to process recycled paper.

Time

is

running out. Soon the equipment will deteriorate, the workers will disperse,

and we

potential buyers will withdraw,

will

be

with another boarded-up factory.

left

James River Corporation's commitment to conservation is well known. We hope you
will extend that commitment to the Hyde Park mill, and leave it as you found it, a
viable functioning business.

names of many prominent city officials, including Mayor Flynn and
City Councillors Menino and Salerno; labor leaders such as Arthur Osborn, president of
the Massachusetts AFL-CIO, Joseph Joyce, president of the Greater Boston Labor Council, and Joanie Parker, president of the Boston Coalition of Labor Union Women. James
Sullivan, president of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and John Paraskevakos, president of the Hyde Park Board of Trade signed on, representing the business community.
The list also included several environmental advocates, community activists, Robert Cor-

The ads

carried the

rigan, chancellor, University of Massachusetts at Boston, cultural luminaries like Sarah

Caldwell of the Opera

Company

of Boston, and basketball star Bill Walton. Aside from

Representative Angelo Scaccia and Senator William Keating, however, state officials

were conspicuously absent from the

list.

draw a response from James River, union
would travel to Washington, D.C. to meet
the New England congressional delegation, then journey on to rally in Richmond, on
James River's doorstep. In this phase of the protest, workers planned to draw attention to
In the event that the advertisements did not

officials

their

As

began coordinating a bus convoy

Hyde Park mill

as a

that

,

"monument to corporate

the external pressure

on James River

pitch, the multibillion-dollar corporation

arrogance."

to deal with the

began

to

Hyde Park mill reached

send new signals.

a fever

Company officials

contacted Alan Davis and asked him to submit another bid for the mill. Davis offered $8.5
million and was told "to expect a decision within 10 days to two weeks."

ment

it

But

appeared that James River was moving to act on the Conservatree bid,

learned that another proposal had
Industries Corporation.

it

mo-

was

come forward, from the Tennessee-based Nolichucky

company would lease the mill with an option

not, however, plan to

at the

22

In substance, the two proposals were completely different.
the

21

to

produce high-grade paper in the

mill. Instead, the

posed to manufacture corrugating medium or the rippled
cardboard. This material could be

made from

Under the Nolichucky plan

purchase in the future. Nolichucky did

liner

company pro-

found between layers of

recycled fiber although

it

would not require

use of the mill's de-inking equipment. According to one paperworker, you could sweep
the streets, bring that material in, and

make

liner out of

a worker ownership offer to the union, although the

work with

the local.

Union members would

later

and found Nolichucky."
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it.

Nolichucky also did not extend

company was

said to be willing to

claim that James River had "gone out
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State

development officials reviewed the Nolichucky proposal and

in a conversation

with James River officials (one that was repeated with Alan Davis and union officials)
indicated that both proposals were equally viable as far as the state was concerned.

A

statement such as this was in keeping with assertions by state development staff that they

were

in no position to choose or designate a buyer. Again, the union felt that their interwere
being ignored.
ests
Drexel Burnham Lambert staff who has been working with union officials to discuss

framework of their Conservatree ESOP were interested in discussing financing opAlan Davis. Drexel had called a meeting with union and Conservatree representatives for Thursday evening, May 5, to work out an agreement on paper. Union

the

tions with

members John Connolly, Joanne Gaines, and Matie Shiel stepped off the elevator at Drexdowntown headquarters that night and were greeted with the news that James River

el's

had leased

their mill to Nolichucky.

At a preliminary meeting the night before, Local 121's international representative had

met with Nolichucky president Jim Montgomery. Montgomery had indicated that his
company had no plans to recognize the union if it won the lease. When Ron Carver
learned Thursday that Nolichucky had indeed signed the lease, he was outraged that state
officials had not uncovered Nolichucky 's anti -union posture. The Drexel meeting that was
to have been another step toward clinching the Conservatree plan became instead a "strategy" session for dealing with the latest setback.
Earlier that day, Montgomery had bluntly stated that union workers would receive no
preferential hiring consideration in the Nolichucky

Hyde Park mill: "We

are an equal

opportunity employer; whether or not a union will eventually represent the workers will
23
entirely on the workers. This is the way it is in the United States." Predictably,
comments drew quick response. Mayor Flynn's spokesman, Neil Sullivan, said,
"If this is how they're responding, then we're obviously off to a bad start." Ron Carver
was more direct; "If Nolichucky thinks we will walk away from our jobs and union, they

depend
those

are sadly mistaken.

We will stand and fight."

members agreed to

rally at the Federal Street office of

David Weinstein, the following day

at

Before the strategy session adjourned, union

Nolichucky 's Boston attorney,

noon.

On Friday, May 6, Alden Raine and Paul Eustace wrote Robert Williams,
James River Corporation,

to voice

president of

concern over Nolichucky 's intentions and to update the

company on their progress with Conservatree.
Throughout our discussions we have emphasized two important public policy concerns: that the

new operator be committed to

restoring union jobs, and that the mill be

used for recycling ....

We have been actively negotiating
servatree

Company

an offer of state financial assistance to the Con-

in its proposal to

appeared to have borne

fruit.

buy the

One reason

mill.

As of this week,

those negotiations

for our strong interest in Conservatree is

commitment to work with the paperworkers' union.
The Hyde Park facility has been a union mill for decades, and should continue

their clear

one. Since James River will continue to

to

be

own the property, we need and expect your

help in resolving this matter.

We are urging Nolichucky

to

work closely and cooperatively with

reopening the mill, and to welcome
unable to

make such

a commitment,

its

the union in

operation as a union shop. If Nolichucky

we would

tions with Conservatree.
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is

strongly urge you to resume negotia-

For Conservatree,
office

came

too

this

affirmation of financial support from the economic development

Commenting on

late.

Herald reporter, Alden Raine

the unsuccessful Conservatree proposal to a Boston

said, "I

was disappointed.

I

had been expressing

River that our discussions with Conservatree about state assistance were
strokes."

Another top

state industrial

development

official

down

James

to

to the short

was more optimistic about

Nolichucky's prospects and told a union representative that Nolichucky personnel had

been running other manufacturing plants and knew what they were doing: "You know

in

your gut when you're working with good capable people," the official concluded, implying that the "gut feeling" hadn't been there for Conservatree. Nolichucky's business plan
didn't call for any state financial support.

The following Monday

the City Council had scheduled a hearing, ostensibly to deal

with the environmental impact of solid waste disposal. Actually, the meeting had been

booked in advance to provide a forum for more discussion on the Hyde Park mill, long
before anyone imagined what was to transpire. With representatives from Nolichucky in
attendance, including David Weinstein, along with union members, the hearing turned
into a contest among councillors to defend the union. Remarks made by Hyde Park councillor Menino directed to Weinstein characterized the prevailing mood: "If you think

come

you're going to
ple

into

my neighborhood with 500 trucks and not rehire the good peo-

who worked there, and you're going

to get city

and

state permits,

wrong." 24 The City Council then passed an ordinance prohibiting the

Hyde Park paper products

until

Nolichuky agreed

you're dead
city

to "respect, recognize

from buying any
and negotiate"

with the union.
In an effort to salvage

its

Dennis Kearney on board.
player,

by

now badly

tarnished image, Nolichucky brought lawyer

A former Middlesex County sheriff and longtime political

Kearney was quick to

strike a nonconfrontational, conciliatory tone. Less than

one

week later, Kearney announced that Nolichucky would meet with union
work out a hiring plan.
Union officials insisted that these meetings take place in City Hall rather than at the
State House. As far as the union was concerned, the terms of its contract were open for

officials to try to

negotiation but not the issue of whether or not there
tained, however, that there

would have

to

would be a union. Kearney main-

be an election after the plant reopened

union representation. Even though Eustace recommended that the union accept

to vote

on

this offer,

union members were adamant in their refusal to yield recognition. In final negotiations,
the terms of which

union retained

chucky had

its

were worked out

in the secretary of labor's State

House office,

recognition, with the specifics of its contract to be decided

set a target date

of July

1

to bring the

later.

the

Noli-

Hyde Park mill back into production.

Throughout the summer of 1988, meetings between the union and Nolichucky

officials

were an on-again, off-again affair. By early fall, rumors had begun to circulate that Nolichucky Industries was in serious financial trouble. Union officials telephoned a Nolichucky plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan, and learned that the facility had been operational
for only two weeks and had not reached maximum capacity. They also found that another
Nolichucky venture, in Puerto Rico, had yet to open and began
delays were attributable to

Globe reported

that

to

reason that Hyde Park

company problems elsewhere. On September 27,

the Boston

Nolichucky was four payments behind on an $850,000 loan from

its Kalamazoo mill was closed. The
Hyde Park paper mill was again uncertain.
The Hyde Park mill had now been closed for almost ten months. Reflecting on all the

Michigan's economic development office and that
fate of the
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organizing, negotiating, and opportunities that had

summed up the

come to pass, one

veteran papermaker

Many paperworkers had

experience as "an emotional roller coaster."

some in the membership had grown cynical about the mill's
Union leadership remained optimistic that the mill would produce again

already taken other jobs, and
ever reopening.

and were confident of their local's

manufacture a quality product.

ability to

"Still, there

were times when one couldn't help but doubt."

No Massachusetts Miracle for Conservatree
In a letter to "Friends of the

Hyde Park mill"

been one year since Conservatree had

in October,

Alan Davis noted that it had
with James River concerning

initiated discussions

the purchase of the plant. Conservatree' s vision of a

model employee partnership and
com-

recycling mill prototype had begun to fade, but the October update indicated that the

pany wasn't ruling anything out.

No one can reliably predict what will happen next.

For the record,

if

the Nolichucky

deal falls through, Conservatree remains interested in purchasing the mill under the

Under these conditions, we believe our plan would be the
Hyde Park.
Perhaps Nolichucky will arrange new financing or sell its lease to other investors
who have enough money to put the project back on track. It's equally possible that the
terms of our

last

proposal.

only viable strategy for reopening

mill will

remain closed, a monument

mental leadership in Massachusetts

to corporate

state

Conservatree had strong opinions regarding
squarely at the Dukakis administration.

arrogance and the lack of environ-

government.

its

failed proposal,

and criticism was leveled

An October newsletter published by the company

concluded the following:
Governor Dukakis* Office of Economic Affairs, the linchpin

in the financial contract,

stonewalled discussions on the proposal, finally dismissing

as too big a public invest-

it

ment. Seeing no demonstrated support from the Governor's office, James River eventually leased the mill to another

company which had planned

non-union and without de-inking. Months
difficulties
still

from

its

later,

to operate the plant

with the lessee facing severe financial

two prior mill acquisitions, Hyde Park remains closed,

its

workers

unemployed.

The same newsletter noted that Conservatree was presented an Outstanding Industry
Award by the National Recycling Coalition at its fall 1988 Seventh Annual National Recycling Congress.

Hyde Park Paper Inc.
Before the year was out the embattled Nolichucky Industries reportedly sold
the

Hyde Park mill

to

David Weinstein, the attorney who had

first

its

interest in

represented the com-

man described in subsequent news reports as a Cape
Macy formed a new company they named Hyde Park Paper
Inc. and planned to have the mill back on line by March 1989. Profiles of the partners
included in the company's press packet indicated that neither man had any previous expe-

pany

Cod

in Boston,

and Robert Macy, a

developer. Weinstein and

rience running a paper mill or working in the paper industry.
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The two have had

several

other business dealings together, including a partnership in another company, Boston
Industries

Group

Inc., of

which Weinstein was chief executive office and Macy president.

David Weinstein also retained

his position as counsel to the

Boston law firm of Perkins,

Smith, Arata and Howard. His legal experience, as described in
literature, included

sign of financial structures in
tions."

Robert

Macy was

complex commercial and

said to be active in real estate

In a February 3 Boston

sounded willing

residential real estate transac-

and business development.

Globe report announcing the reopening of the

to leave his

mill, Weinstein

Nolichucky Hyde Park experience behind: "We're going

run a kinder, gentler paper company."

new

Hyde Park company

corporate and commercial law with "particular emphasis on the de-

to

A few days earlier the partners had negotiated a

contract with the union that eliminated two holidays and required

20 percent of their health insurance but retained premium pay

members

for Saturday

to

pay for

and Sunday

work.

Union members

heartily endorsed the

new owners' claim

that "there are things that a

small entrepreneurial

company can do

ratification meetings,

union treasurer Matie Shiel stood before the new owners and ex-

that a

major corporation can't do." During contract

plained that the union could not tolerate the same corporate mentality that had prevailed
it was equally clear to union leadership that the attitude some union
members had adopted under James River would likewise undermine the success of their
new venture.
The new partners planned to create a market niche for recycled paper manufactured at
the Hyde Park mill but conceded that their options remained open. Financing for the plan
had come entirely from private sources. In an interview on April 12, 1989, the first day
the mill had been running steadily since the shutdown, Hyde Park president David Wein-

under lames River;

one of its objectives was

stein

acknowledged

least

70 percent recycled (recycled pulp

that

the final product consistency).

is

to

manufacture a product that was

commonly mixed with

On this day the mill was producing rolls of paper that were

84 percent recycled and the president was clearly elated. The furnish for
primarily "mill broke" or second-quality paper from other mills that

in-house or sold.

is

this

paper was

commonly reused

A feedstock of this sort is expensive but not as costly as virgin pulp.

Hyde Park Paper's newly made paper was
from wastepaper

at

virgin material to give

that

technically recycled but

was not yet being made

had been de-inked and was not "post-consumer" (otherwise des-

tined for disposal) in origin.

One

of two paper machines was back on line with a daily

production output of 123 tons and approximately one hundred workers were back on the
job. Weinstein estimated that

more workers would be added

as the mill stepped

up

capacity.

Business was brisk for the upstart Hyde Park mill. Weinstein was aggressively courting
stores, and the company had won bids to furnish
Cod public schools and the state of New Jersey, and would be
dealing paper to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the state's newly beefed-up
procurement legislation. In yet another interesting twist in the rebirth of the Hyde Park
mill, Conservatree won recycled paper bids in several states and planned to honor its new
contracts with Hyde Park Paper, including some that was to be shipped across the country
retail interest

from leading office-supply

recycled paper to the Cape

to California.

For the time being, the owners were "appreciative of the

and had not ruled out the

asm

for the reopening

state's interest in recycling"

possibility of seeking public financing at a later date. Enthusi-

was shared by workers, management, and the Hyde Park commu-
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nity.

On the morning the plant came back on line,

a paperworker stopped at a local coffee

shop and ordered seven dozen doughnuts for the crew

at the mill.

The waitress wondered

out loud where such a large order was headed, so the worker explained that they were for

who had been working around the clock to restart the "old Diamond
Customers gathered around the counter broke into a round of applause.
employees

mill."

Epilogue

Even though Hyde Park Paper

had won contracts worth $800,000 with the U.S. Govin California, and was reportedly generating

Inc.

ernment Printing Office, $2.5 million

$500,000
after

in

weekly revenues, the mill was shut down

reopening. Mill executives

its

first

in

June of 1989, just three months

explained the closing as a temporary two-week

setback resulting from a short supply of operating capital. But as the
passed, the mill sat idle while
tional

money could be acquired to help

On October

17, 1989, the

Boston Globe reported that Hyde Park Paper owners David
eight-count lender-liability suit against the Bos-

ton Trade Bank, the three-year-old institution that
mill venture.

The $25

that addi-

ease the plant over this one-time hurdle.

Macy had filed an

Weinstein and Robert

summer months

management remained "cautiously optimistic"

is

said to have invested $3 million in the

million suit alleged that the bank "precipitously and wrongfully,"

with "deceit" and "misrepresentation," cut off funding to the mill in June: "Seven

bank asked Weinstein and Macy to start Hyde Park Paper, promising
company, and 12 weeks after the start of mill operations, the bank unilaterally ceased to provide any additional money and put 115 people out
of work." The company's claim seeks to prevent the bank from liquidating the mill's
months

after the

sufficient financing to support the

physical assets to recoup

its

investment and would award $75 million in damages

— triple

the mill's projected annual profit.

Relations between Weinstein, Macy, and Boston Trade Bank president Daniel Ciotti
were irreparably damaged. The papermaking venture begun by Hyde Park Paper Inc.
celebrated as a "model" for future plant closings at its April opening, was finished.

The James River Corporation was again
peared imminent.

One

Months

trying to sell the mill.

few prospective buyers had inspected the

officials reported that a

state

later

plant, but

company

no

sale ap-

environmental official reported that no buyers seeking public

funding had surfaced. The plant remained in good repair, the boilers were on, but the

papermaking machines

sat idle.

For the Hyde Park paperwokers who had quit jobs

rejoin the mill the previous spring, the situation

unemployment benefits following
Shiel,

"People are hurting ...

people have too ...

I

can't see

I

and appeared

to

be

at

to
for

the June shutdown. According to union treasurer

have 85 percent given up, and

them taking

All the while, city and state officials had
tives

was grim. Many were not eligible

the

I

would imagine

same chance again."
little headway with new

made

odds over future direction. In the

fall

Made

that other

recycling initia-

of 1989 an official of the

Works Department charged that promises of state financial assismade good while acknowledging that the city is proceeding "cau-

city of Boston's Public

tance have not been

tiously" with plans to expand a pilot curbside recycling

off centers in two neighborhoods.

had been offered but
its latest

that the city

The

state

had yet

to

"come back with

draft of a state solid waste master plan, the

tion (formerly the

DEQE)

program and add monthly drop-

countered that substantial financial assistance

called for recycling

year 2000.
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a response." Meanwhile, in

Department of Environmental Protec-

46 percent of the Bay

State's

garbage by the

Another Chapter

On Wednesday,
solved,

it

August

15, 1990,

was announced

more than one year

that the mill

had been sold

after

for

Hyde Park Paper

$7 million

headed by the Tembec Paper Company of Canada. At a press conference
following day, state and local officials gathered to
as the latest

owners are known,

to

Hyde

welcome

Inc. dis-

an investor group

to

in the mill the

the Patriot Paper Corporation,

Park. Governor Dukakis was on hand to salute

acknowledging

Patriot Paper's plan to restart de-inking operations,

that

such a mill "helps

solve a very, very serious environmental problem." Speaking to the region's fiscal woes,

Mayor Flynn pointed
"We're

of the papermakers
latest

to the mill's

reopening as a signal that the city

who had

holding

its

own:

many

rejoined the mill for three months in 1989 and endured the

fourteen-month shutdown, the jobs they

left

behind would be available immediately.

Patriot Paper's business plan calls for a multiyear,
state-of-the-art pulping, de-inking,
is

is

getting a lot of things done, even in a period of economic uncertainty." For

$54 million mill

retrofit to install

and wastewater treatment equipment. The investment

being financed in part through the sale of $37.5 million in tax-exempt bonds secured by

the Boston Industrial

Development Financing Authority.

Patriot Paper president

Mark

Baisch brought the plant back on line September 4, 1990, with one machine operating,

and resumed

full

production in January 1991 With a background in recycled boxboard
.

papermaking, Baisch was quickly able to resume production
solely

on several grades of wastepaper blended

stant monitoring

By November

in a

in

Hyde Park by

custom feedstock

relying

that required con-

and manipulation.
1990, Patriot Paper was manufacturing paper that was 100 percent recy-

cled, approximately 10 percent of

which was post-consumer

corporation's ties to a Canadian paper

in origin.

company were particularly

Much of the feedstock the mill was pulping

It

appeared that the

helpful with regard to

November came from
made
from Tembec pulp. When purchasing this feedstock, Patriot Paper officials knew exactly
what type of paper they were buying. Such a strategy eliminated some of the guesswork
sourcing wastepaper.

in

a company that had misprinted or otherwise voided a particular job using paper

involved in buying wastepaper, as there are dozens of grades of paper and various levels of

contamination associated with paper recycling. For the plant to routinely accept commercially generated,

grade with a

post-consumer wastepaper, the product will need to be of consistent

minimum of contaminants

(such as the plastic windows sometimes used in

envelopes, sticky labels, and so forth).

Baisch projects that the post-consumer content of Patriot's paper could eventually ex-

ceed 50 percent. By

late

1991 with the
,

new

de-inking facility complete and employing a

combination of flotation and washing technology, the owners believe that the Hyde Park
facility will

be the most advanced recycling mill

Hyde Park paperworkers

in the

United States. In the meantime,

are expertly utilizing existing equipment to perform a combina-

tion of chemical de-inking

and pulp washing

to prepare their feedstock.

The new

flotation

de-inking technology to be incorporated in production will use clay to help separate ink

from paper. Many glossy paper stocks, often used in magazines, are typically clay coated,
and the city's recycling efforts stand to benefit from new demand for old magazines when
the flotation equipment comes on line. The leftover clay sludge from the de-inking process

may

also play a role in the region's waste

management practices,

as

it is

potentially

useful as a capping material to seal landfills once they reach capacity.

The Patriot Paper venture in Hyde Park holds new promise for the mill's employees as
The mill continues to operate as a union shop, and the paperworkers have been ex-

well.
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tended a 10 percent employee stock ownership plan in addition to a profit-sharing pro-

gram based on the mill's operating

profit, to

be distributed on an equal basis as a percent-

age of hours worked. With the supply of post-consumer wastepaper collected in recycling

programs across the country continually expanding and unprecedented consumer
in recycled products in the marketplace,
greater.

were

demand

Walking through the mill one evening

steadily

in

for recycled paper has never

November, while bales of wastepaper

conveyed to a watery bath and beaters churned away, a gaping hole

plant floor waited in anticipation of new equipment, and a ribbon of paper

in the

some ten

feet

way continuously through a paper machine gathering finally in huge rolls,
observer saw evidence that a new era of papermaking in Hyde Park was under way.&t-'

wide wound
this

interest

been

its

An earlier version of this article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree requirements for
John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs Master of Science program, University of Massa-

the

chusetts at Boston.
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